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Konstantinos Moutoussis*
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece
The purpose of the present article is to try and give a brief, scientific perspective on
several issues raised in the Philosophy of Perception literature. This perspective gives a
central role to the brain mechanisms that underlie perception: a percept is something
that emerges when the brain is activated in a certain way and thus all perceptual
experiences (whether veridical, illusory, or hallucinatory) have a common cause behind
them, namely a given brain-activation pattern. What distinguishes between different
cases of perception is what has caused this activation pattern, i.e., something very
separate and very different from the perceptual experience itself. It is argued that
separating the perceptual event from its hypothetical content, a direct consequence of
the way everyday language is structured, creates unnecessary ontological complications
regarding the nature of the hypothetical ‘object’ of perception. A clear distinction
between the physical properties of the real world on the one hand (e.g., wavelength
reflectance), and the psychological properties of perceptual experiences on the other
(e.g., color) is clearly made. Finally, although perception is a way of acquiring
knowledge/information about the world, this acquisition should be considered as a
cognitive process which is separate to and follows perception. Therefore, the latter
should remain neutral with respect to the ‘correctness’ or ‘truth’ of the knowledge
acquired.
Keywords: brain, perception, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy
NEUROBIOLOGY BEHIND PERCEPTION: CHANGING THE
QUESTION FROM ‘WHAT’ TO ‘WHY’
When a neuroscientist considers perception or any other mental process, the starting point is the
existence of a biological ‘machine’ (Ryle, 1949), the brain, the activation of which generates all
mental states and events that appear to us as if taking place on the stage of a ‘Cartesian Theater’
in the mind (Dennett, 1991). There are two main consequences arising from this thesis. The
first one is the fact that the only direct cause of any mental state/event is a given pattern of
brain activation: perception is created by a perceptual system, and behind each and every percept
there is a certain neuronal activation, fully responsible for causing this percept. What produces
the neuronal activation is a separate question: it can be physical objects sending light to the eye,
artificial brain stimulation by an electrode, an epileptic seizure, magic mushrooms, auto-activation
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while dreaming, and many more. All these alternative brain-
stimulation events can theoretically have an identical result: a
specific brain-activation pattern, leading to the formation of a
specific percept. The Causal Theory of Perception (see Grice,
1961; Lewis, 1980; Snowdon, 1981) is a philosophical standpoint
in harmony with this view, although too much energy is wasted in
trying to accurately define what veridical perception is and how it
differs from illusions and hallucinations. Trying to semantically
categorize different perceptual experiences into different groups
can indeed be an interesting, challenging game. Regarding the
nature of perception, however, it does not offer much more
insight on top of the fact that specific, individual perceptual
experiences are caused by specific, individual brain activation
patterns. To deny that the latter is neither identical with nor
constitutive of the experience itself (Child, 1994, pp. 161–162) is
a step back toward dualism.
The second consequence of a brain-centered theory of
perception is that, since the percept is the creation of a
given neuronal system, its characteristics will depend on and
directly reflect the properties of this system. This does not
imply that perception is of an esoteric nature and in complete
isolation from the physical world. Such isolation would miss the
point, since perceptual systems have evolved in order to enable
organisms to interact with their environment. In the example
of vision, light falling on objects activates the brain by the
process of phototransduction, during which photoreceptors at
the retina transform electromagnetic energy into electrochemical
activation, which in turn sends a neural signal to the rest of
the visual brain. This light has specific characteristics which
are determined by the properties of the reflecting object (i.e.,
carries information), and so determines the characteristics of the
elicited brain activation. Thus, the characteristics of a percept are
dictated by both the perceptual system which creates it and the
properties of the physical object we are looking at. In this way
we can acquire objective knowledge about the world, albeit in
a very subjective manner. Perception is therefore characterized
by an objective subjectivity or, to say it perhaps better, a
subjective objectivity. Objectivity, since the transformation from
the physical to the perceptual world follows certain constant,
reliable rules. Subjectivity, since each percept is created by a
perceptual system and therefore its characteristics depend on the
properties of the latter: the same chair looks different to a human,
a cat or a bat, and perhaps looks different even between two
humans. Plato has realized that what we perceive are ‘reflexions
of reality’ (Plato: The Republic, Book VII). The nature of these
reflections depends on the nature of the perceptual system that
both creates and perceives them.
The characteristics of the percepts created by the brain do not
solely depend on the bottom-up processing of incoming sensory
information, but are also determined by top-down mechanisms
reflecting previous experiences of the subject. Starting from
Hermann von Helmholtz more than a century ago (Helmholtz,
1866), the idea that perception could be seen as an inference
process, rather than the intuitive ‘normal-picture scenario,’ has
become increasing popular. A percept is the result of such
inference process based on the internal representation generated
by the brain. Recently, there is some further development of this
line of thinking, drawn on the estimation theory and Bayesian
inference from the field of statistics, to formulate mathematically
rigorous models for perception that can be tested quantitatively
against experimental data (for examples see Knill and Richards,
1996; Girshick et al., 2011; Clark, 2013). This shift is away from
the brain as a passive filter of sensations and toward a view of the
brain as a statistical organ that generates hypotheses which are
tested against sensory evidence. The brain never knows anything
about an object for sure but can only make maximum likelihood
predictions about what an object is, how it will appear in the
future, or how it will interact with different senses based on the
sensory information we have at present. Perception is making
predictions and thus percepts are reconstructions of the world
around us that represent our best guess as to what is out there,
based on the statistics of how sensory information impinges
on the sense organs. In this way, the ambiguity of sensory
information can be dealt with. In 3D vision, for example, the
problem of reconstructing a 3D object given two 2D views is
inherently under-constrained: given a homographic projection,
infinitely many objects of differing size can produce the same
image on the retina. It is only through heuristics and tricks
based on natural image statistics that the visual system is able
to generate a plausible guess at an object’s 3D structure that is
correct most of the time (but not always – see1 for a nice example).
The reality we experience is our best guess at how to reconstruct
the world based on what most probably generated our sensory
inputs. In cases where the brain cannot decide on which of the
explanations is most probable, we can have instances of bistable
(or multistable) vision (e.g., Necker, 1832; Blake and Logothetis,
2002).
To a neuroscientist, all there is to a percept is the
neurobiological mechanism behind it. This is true for veridical
perceptions, illusions or hallucinations, and there is thus nothing
peculiar or problematic regarding the last two. Under normal
circumstances, the particular brain activation that leads to the
particular percept of a chair comes around with the participation
of two extra factors: a real chair and light. A whole neural process
is initiated by the latter being reflected from the former, activating
the retina at first, then being processed by the rest of the visual
system, and at some point reaching the necessary and sufficient
neuronal activation that leads to the percept. The presence of
either light or a chair, however, is not necessary and definitely
not sufficient. As mentioned above, the desired activation can
also be achieved by alternative means – if it does, the percept
is there and no real chair or light need to be there at all.
Therefore, although the chair is initiating the birth of the percept
under normal circumstances and although the nervous system
has evolved to detect real chairs, the chair is not a part of the
mental state of the subject, not even the direct cause of this mental
state. In some cases it is the indirect cause, in that it causes the
brain activation which in turn causes/is the mental state. Thus,
instead of asking what it is that one perceives, it would be more
informative to ask why one perceives something. The existence
of a nervous system creating perception is always part of the
answer and, quite often but not always, the presence of light and a
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4QcyW-qTUg
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1357
fpsyg-07-01357 September 13, 2016 Time: 11:37 # 3
Moutoussis A Brain-Based View of Perceptual Phenomena
physical object are parts of the answer too. In general, describing
mental events by using language structured to relate phenomena
in the physical world creates serious theoretical issues in the
philosophy of perception. One of these is the separation between
the verb/action, the subject acting and the object being acted
upon. In my opinion, this separation is fraud and creates more
problems than it solves. These problems disappear if one accepts
that there is no difference between a percept and the content of
that percept, i.e., no separation between the action of perceiving
and a hypothetical object toward this action is directed2.
From the above it follows that, as far as the mental process of
perceiving is concerned, there is no difference between a veridical
percept, an illusion or a hallucination: all three are equivalent
mental states, because they share a common brain activation
pattern. Even if the activation of the brain is not identical (e.g.,
see Weisz et al., 2007), there is no way for the subject to know
that. It is also quite likely that more than one activation-patterns
lead to a particular experience, so we cannot be sure that every
time we have the same experience the brain3 is activated in the
same way. We should be more sure, however, that a particular
brain activation leads to a particular perceptual experience, and
thus if we are able to artificially replicate this activation we
can produce a hallucination that is indistinguishable from the
original, ‘veridical’ perceptual experience. People have tried to
fabricate differences between them by saying that a hallucination
is ‘private’ to its subject, in the sense that only the subject of the
hallucination is aware of the particular experience. But this is
true for stimulus-induced vision as well, since what we are aware
of is not the physical object itself but rather the mental percept,
which is equally private in the case of ‘veridical’ perception as in
the case of hallucination. Although the knowledge that a chair is
out there can be shared by many different people, each perceptual
experience induced by this chair in each different nervous system
is as unique and private as it comes. This issue is sometimes
confused, for example by Price (1932, pp. 31–32) when he
compares the perception of a real object with a hallucination and
describes the latter as ‘the fleeting product of cerebral processes,’
whereas the former as ‘a real constituent of a material object,
wholly independent of the observers mind and organism.’ The
fact that the physical object is totally independent from the
mind and the organism of the observer does not mean that the
same is true for the percept that this object initiates. Without
a visual system, without the existence and the activation of the
relevant perceptual areas of the brain, no percept -be it veridical
or hallucinatory- would exist.
THE COMMON FACTOR
A philosophical position in agreement with the brain-centered
view described above is the Common Factor principle (see Fish,
2Furthermore, there is no separate subject to whom all these perceptual events are
displayed – the subject is nothing more but the collection of these and other mental
states and events.
3The fact that the two events take place at different times and that the brain is not
a fixed object, means that we are probably also talking about two different brains.
Furthermore, since noise plays a central role in neuronal responses, even the ‘same’
brain is never activated in exactly the same way.
2010, p. 3). This principle states that all types of perceptual
experience share a common mental state – something which
seems obvious to a neuroscientist, as it is a direct consequence
of the presence of a common brain-activation pattern behind
the common metal state. As mentioned above, it is logical to
assume that activating the brain in a certain way should result
in experiencing the same mental state; otherwise we would live
in a world that makes little sense (apples should sometimes
look red and sometimes look blue etc.). Therefore, a veridical
perception and a hallucination which are phenomenologically
identical, do share a common mental state as well as a common
brain activation pattern. There is, however, a difference in what is
causing this activation: in one case it is the presence of light and a
physical stimulus, whereas in the other case the brain is activated
by a different reason (see Child, 1994, p. 145 for a similar view).
As far as perceptual experience is concerned, however, the two
cases are identical if the same brain-activation pattern is behind
both.
One could unnecessarily complicate things by saying that the
two distinct mental states differ in representational content, or
in their status as perceptual evidence (Martin, 1994, p. 745).
However, the fact that in one case the mental state gives correct
information about the world whereas in the other it gives false
information, does not make them different mental states – their
status as perceptual evidence depends on something external
(the presence or absence of an object). Two identical veridical
percepts can also be distinct, just because one takes place at 12:00
and the other at 12:01, but that doesn’t mean that they cannot
share an identical mental state. Similarly, if a twin-universe exists,
all mental states would come in pairs, the members of each
pair being distinct identical entities. The best way to avoid such
unnecessary complications is to stick to the notion that there is
nothing more to a percept than its phenomenology, thus keeping
representational content and belief acquisition separate from it.
The Disjunctive Theory of Perception (see Haddock and
Macpherson, 2008; Byrne and Logue, 2009) rejects the Common
Factor principle and states that hallucination and perception do
not share a common mental state. A common example used to
challenge the idea that two percepts which are indiscriminable
should necessarily share the same phenomenology is the
following (see Fish, 2010, p. 152): stimulus B cannot be
distinguished from stimulus A because their intensity difference
is below their just noticable difference (JND), as is the intensity
difference between C and B (where IA < IB < IC), but yet
one could distinguish between A and C if their intensity
difference is above JND. The argument is that if indiscriminability
implies identical phenomenology, one should not be able to
distinguish between A and C either. From this it follows that
veridical percepts and hallucinations could still have a different
phenomenology despite being indiscriminable. However, the
JND depends on the adaptation state of the system and therefore
the phenomenology of B is different to the phenomenology of
C for a system adapted to A, but not for a system adapted to B.
If we call these two phenomenologies B1 and B2, respectively,
A cannot be distinguished from B because both have the same
phenomenology B1, whereas B cannot be distinguished from C
because they both have the same phenomenology B2. Therefore,
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A and C have a different phenomenology and this is why they can
be discriminated.
Although the JND argument does not demonstrate a case in
which indiscriminable objects have a different phenomenology,
we cannot rule out the possibility that this could theoretically
happen. Nevertheless, given that the phenomenology of a
perceptual experience is fully determined by the pattern of brain
activation behind it, if the technology was available to bring the
brain in the exact same state as a particular physical stimulus
does, one would experience the exact same percept. A veridical
percept and a hallucination would then have exactly the same
phenomenology, as well as the same underlying mental and
neural states. A negative disjunctivist would claim that the two
share a common property, but the former has a special property
in addition, the effects of which the latter inherits via their
common property (see Fish, 2010, p. 100). However, this is just
a more complicated way of saying that veridical perception is
special because the brain activation is caused by light coming
from a physical object. The two ‘types’ of perception continue to
share a common brain-activation pattern, a common mental state
and a common phenomenology. What they do not share is the
presence or absence of an object, something which lies outside
the perceptual experience itself but rather belongs to the reality
of the physical world.
ON THE NATURE OF THE PERCEPTUAL
‘OBJECT’
Focusing on the brain could give a simple, straightforward answer
to one of the major questions in Philosophy of Perception, namely
what is the object of perception. When I look at a chair, what
is it that I really experience? Is it the chair itself, the physical
object? Or is it some sort of a ‘mental object’? What is the ‘content’
of my perception, and what is the nature of this content? Such
puzzles and ontological commitments disappear if one adopts
the idea that a distinction between a percept and its content
(see Martin, 1994, p. 464) is not necessary at all and thus there
is no object, be it mental or physical, that is being perceived.
Indeed, the distinction between a subject, a verb and an object
that is so fundamental in everyday language, does not seem
appropriate to describe the perceptual process and the mental
world in general, nicely demonstrating the fact that philosophical
issues are sometimes more a matter of linguistic practices than
anything else.
In a first attempt to overcome the ‘special’ cases of illusion
and especially hallucination, in which there is no physical
object that we perceive, the theory of Sense Data states that (in
general) we perceive mental rather than physical entities (see
Robinson, 1994). This approach solves the problem of perceiving
non-existing objects during illusions, hallucinations, imagery,
dreaming etc. Furthermore, it takes care of the so called time lag
argument, which is that it takes some time for physical stimuli
to reach our eyes and get processed by our visual system, and
therefore what we experience is something that could very well
not exist as such in the physical world any more (Russell, 1927,
p. 155; Russell, 1948, p. 204). However, Sense Data theory is
problematic regarding the nature of a non-physical object: it is
common to talk about mental states or events, but what exactly
would such a thing as a mental object be? It was hinted earlier
that equating perception with its content gets rid of this dilemma
regarding the ‘owner’ of the features that we perceive, as well
as of the necessity to create mental objects, such as sense data,
possessing these properties. The Adverbial Theory of perception
does exactly that, eliminating the distinction between perception
and its object. Instead of talking about objects which are being
sensed, it appeals to ways of sensing (see Jackson, 1975). For
example, instead of saying ‘John saw red’ we can say ‘John saw
redly,’ thus getting rid of the necessity of the existence of a red
object (be it physical or mental) that is being sensed. Do such
theories isolate perception from the physical world? As explained
earlier, despite its phenomenological subjectivity, perception can
provide us with constant, reliable, objective information about
our physical environment. It doesn’t matter what a good-to-eat
banana looks like to a monkey, as long as good bananas always
looks this way to the particular monkey, while bad bananas
look a different way. Similarly, the fact that the relationship
between the symbol 38.7 and a body of high temperature is
totally arbitrary does not mean that thermometers are of no
use in giving us valuable information. This has been realized by
Locke, who argues that perceptual experiences are subjective but
reliable signs of their regular causes: ‘...the Idea of Whiteness,
or Bitterness, as it is in the Mind... has all the real conformity
it can, or ought to have, with Things without us’ (Essay, IV.
iv. 4).
In trying to answer the question of why perceptual experiences
have the phenomenology that they have, the Phenomenal
Principle states that if we are aware of a quality, there must
be something of which we are aware that possesses this quality
(Price, 1932, p. 3; Robinson, 1994, p. 32). If a physical object
is implied by something, then the principle is wrong given the
existence of things such as hallucinations, dreams, epileptic
seizures, artificial brain-stimulation, magic-mushrooms etc. If,
on the other hand, something refers to a mental entity like a
percept, we have the problem of artificially separating the percept
from its content – not to mention the arbitrary introduction
of a self, magically observing all this from the ‘outside’. The
Adverbial theory rejects the Phenomenal principle but has still
the problem of demanding a separate observer for the perceptual
experience, an observer who is separate from the experience itself.
However, it would be both simpler and more appropriate to say
that there is only one single something that exists: the mental
state itself. A neurobiologist would thus replace the Phenomenal
Principle with a statement like this: ‘For each and every percept
experienced, there exists a certain neuronal activation generating
it, and there might or might not be an object in the real world,
whose physical properties determine the pattern of this activation
and therefore the properties of this percept.’
SO IS ANYTHING BEING ‘REPRESENTED’?
The classical question of whether perception is representational
or not, i.e., whether a percept has an intentional content that
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represents the world as being some way (Martin, 1994, p. 745;
Byrne, 2001), is another good example of how some theoretical
issues on perception are mainly a matter of language and
definitions. The idea that a percept must necessarily be about
something is the basic view of representationalism (Tye, 1995,
2009), which is in opposition to pure sense-datum theorists
that do not accept visual experiences to have any intentionality.
For the scientist, on the other hand, an object in the physical
world sends a particular light composition to the eye of the
observer, which causes neuronal activation at several levels of the
visual system. The relationship between each of these activation
patterns and the properties of the object is not chaotic, but
follows particular algorithms and transformations of the signal
that create several neuronal representations of these properties at
different levels in the brain. Thus, in the case of stimulus-driven
vision, the process of creating perception in the visual system
contains several different representations of the information
regarding the stimulus characteristics. The relationship between
the physical stimulus and the emerging percept is also
deterministic (for a specific perceptual system), from which it
follows that we also have a mental representation of the physical
properties of the object. So if the term ‘representational’ means
that something has a given relationship to something else, like
the body temperature to the thermometer reading, then stimulus-
driven perception is clearly representational.
What happens when the brain activation is not elicited by a
visual stimulus, like in a hallucination, in which case there is
no representational relationship between neuronal and mental
events and the characteristics of some physical object? In this
case, perception is not representing something from the physical
world, as would be the case with a digital thermometer having a
random reading due to a failure in its electronic circuits. The fact
that perception is sometimes ‘representational’ and sometimes
not, is not such a big problem after all – it is just a more
complicated way of saying that activation of the visual brain can
sometimes be caused by factors other than a physical stimulus.
Furthermore, the fact that percepts are mind-dependent does
not necessarily mean that there is a problem in conceiving the
existence of a ‘mind-independent’ world (Child, 1994, p. 149).
Although it is theoretically possible that, as in the well-known
science-fiction film The Matrix (1999) brains are plugged-in a
supercomputer and we are living in a virtual reality, we have
some clues to assume that there is something out there causing
our sensory experiences: several different percepts can arise from
the same physical object, all of them cease to exist if the object
is removed, the latter can be experienced by other people as
well, one can go to bed and find it in place next morning,
and so on. Still, all this could be the result of a very successful
virtual environment and there would be no real way for us to
know.
As mentioned above, when brain activation is not created
by the interaction of the nervous system with light and
physical objects, perception loses its representational character.
Categorizing the many different ways of activating the brain is
not straightforward: hallucinations are cases in which perception
is not caused by an object in the real world, but what if a
real cat in front of a disturbed mind makes him see a tiger?
Is this an illusion or a hallucination? If we say that veridical
perceptions are caused by light falling on the retina from real
objects, would retinal activation via a prosthetic camera count
as veridical? What about the case of perceiving a non-existing
person in front of me, not because of a drug that I took but
because of a hi-tech, virtual-reality hologram? This issue has
puzzled philosophers a great deal, and there are several even
more peculiar hypothetical examples of perceptual states such
as ‘The Brain before the Eyes’ and ‘The Light Meter’ (Lewis,
1980), or ‘Tom and Tim’ (Tye, 1982). What these examples
show is that it is not easy to find a definition which accurately
describes and distinguishes between different types of perception.
However, apart from the challenging language game that this is,
do we really need such definitions in order to understand what
is going on? All that we need to know is that perception arises
whenever the brain is activated in a particular way, by any reason
or means.
PHYSICAL VS. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ENTITIES: THE EXAMPLE OF COLOR
A good example in order to understand how percepts are
psychological entities created by the brain rather than physical
entities existing in the physical world is color. The science of color
supports the view that phenomenal character is a property of the
experience (Byrne, 2002, p. 9) rather than not (Tye, 2000), and its
phenomenology can be nicely connected with known facts about
the anatomy and physiology of the visual system. Metamers, for
example, are stimuli with a different light composition that look
exactly the same color, nicely demonstrating that color vision
does not necessarily inform us about the precise properties of
objects in the real world4. Instead, the phenomenon is explained
by the neurophysiological fact that there are three different cone
types with different sensitivities across the visible spectrum. The
Trichromatic Theory of Color Vision (see Blake and Sekuler,
2006, p. 246) can also explain the fact that any triplet of primary5
colors can give rise to the full gamut of the colors we perceive.
Furthermore, the fact that a color cannot be red and green (or
blue and yellow) at the same time, together with the fact that
we need four (rather than three) names in order to roughly
describe all the colors that we perceive, is a direct consequence
of the way the cone input combines upstream from the retina
to create opponent color-pairs (see Blake and Sekuler, 2006,
p. 258). Finally, the fact that neuronal circuits in the brain
compare lights coming from different part of the visual field is
responsible for the well-known phenomena of color constancy
and color induction6 (Land, 1977). Color vision thus nicely
demonstrates that the characteristics of the visual experience
4Freeman and Simoncelli (2011) have shown that grossly distorted visual images
can also be metameric in peripheral vision – another case in which different
physical objects can lead to a common percept.
5In such a triplet, none of the three colors can be synthesized from a combination
of the other two.
6Colour constancy refers to the fact that colors do not change much with changes
in illumination, whereas color induction to the fact that we can change the color of
a surface by changing the color of its surround.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1357
fpsyg-07-01357 September 13, 2016 Time: 11:37 # 6
Moutoussis A Brain-Based View of Perceptual Phenomena
are determined by the way in which the perceptual system is
constructed. To say it with a philosopher’s words, ‘colors are a
feature of the way we process visual information rather than a
feature of the objective, mind-independent world’ (Fish, 2010,
p. 145).
The realization that color is not a mind-independent object
can generalize to perception as a whole. The old philosophical
question of ‘looking red’ vs. ‘being red’ is non-existent
for scientists, because there is only ‘looking red’: red is a
psychological property, not a physical one, and therefore it
can only exist as a result of the activation of a visual system.
When a surface of high reflectance for long-wave light and low
reflectance for the rest of the spectrum sends light to a primate
retina, the retina transduces this light into neural signal and
sends it to the thalamus. From there, the signal reaches the
primary visual cortex, areas V2 and V4 and so on, and then, at
some unknown point in time, the mental event of experiencing
redness takes place (see Zeki, 1993 for an excellent review of
the visual system). This private mental event is constant for
each one of us, but could be different from one person to
another. We all refer to this experience as ‘red,’ because we have
agreed to give this name to the experience that we have when
looking to a surface of such and such a reflectance, whatever
this experience might be for each one of us. Thus, when talking
about a psychological property PS such as color, nothing is PS
but rather some things feel PS. Similarly, when talking about a
physical property PH such as reflectance, nothing feels PH but
some things are PH.
Failing to realize the distinction between physical and
psychological properties is often a cause of confusion in the
philosophical literature. For example, color realism (see Byrne
and Hilbert, 2003) would claim that a percept is not red, that
redness is not a property of this mental event but rather that
the mental event is representing red, which is a property of an
object in the physical world. This statement is incorrect, as red is
indeed nothing more than a mental experience/state. As already
mentioned, the presence of this experience might be related to
the presence of a physical object that has a certain spectrum
reflectance: light from that object falling on the retinae initiates
a series of events in our visual system that lead to the creation
of a red experience. If one wants to describe this by saying
that the particular percept represents the particular reflectance
properties of the object, then this is fine but it does not add
much to our knowledge of what is going on. Furthermore, if
one uses the word ‘red’ to refer to a physical property, namely
a high reflectance for long-wave light, then again the problem is
mainly a linguistic one. The important thing is to realize that,
as physical objects have physical properties, similarly mental
events (such as percepts) have psychological properties and that,
whatever names one chooses for them, the two should not be
confused.
Color is perhaps the most profound example in perplexing
the physical with the psychological, but the problem is more
generally present. Similar to the distinction between reflectance
and color, there is also a distinction between oscillation
amplitude and loudness, relative (to the background) energy
and brightness, frequency and pitch etc. A percept can also
have ‘sizeness,’ a psychological property related to the physical
property of size. In the Müller-Lyer (1889) illusion, what is
it that is different between the two lines that are perceived?
It is not the length of the two lines, since length is a
property of physical objects rather than of percepts, and
also the two physical lines are of the same length. What is
different is the ‘lenghtness’ of the two percepts, a psychological
property which is related to the physical property of length.
This relationship between the physical and the psychological
has been exhaustively investigated in psychophysics, including
mathematical formulas describing it (see Stevens, 1960). This
is possible, despite the fact that ‘length’ and ‘lenghtness’ exist
in different spaces – the physical vs. the mental. What is
not possible is a comparison between them: we could never
have a Muller-Lyer illusion with a single line and ask subjects
to compare the lenthness of their percept with the length
of the real line on the page (“does the line look longer
than it is?”). One can only compare between similar things:
either between physical properties, using real measurements,
or between psychological properties, using measures of the
psychological effect.
MORE ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
NATURE OF PERCEPTS
Perhaps because vision is so dominant among our senses, it
intuitively feels as if things in the physical world are exactly
as they visually appear to us. It is quite difficult and counter-
intuitive to digest the fact that the color of a red tomato shining
under the sun does not belong to the tomato per se, but is
rather a creation of our own perceptual system7. The physical
property of the tomato which contributes to the creation of
this color by the brain, i.e., the reflectance of the object for
different wavelengths, is not colored at all. Therefore, it is wrong
to claim that the properties of our experience belong to the
object rather than to the percept. After all, nothing feels like
anything unless there is a perceptual system there to feel it. The
fallacy is more easily revealed in the case of senses other than
vision. Is sweetness the property of a cake? Would a cake be
sweet if there was no one to taste it? Couldn’t the same cake
taste totally not-sweet to a creature having a different nervous
system from the one that we have? Wouldn’t this same cake
taste less sweet to the same person, if it is eaten after eating
honey or while having the flu (Locke, 1961, p. 124)? Sweetness
is as much a property of the cake as color is a property of the
tomato. One can still argue that a representation is taking place
here, as long as it is clearly understood that there is nothing
‘sweet’ in the properties which are being represented (i.e., the
chemical composition of the cake). The latter are neither sweet
nor sour, the only property they have is the ability to activate the
(particular type of) brain in a way that generates the experience of
sweetness. The exact same arguments apply equally well in vision,
7However, back in Isaac Newton (1704) wrote: ‘For the rays to speak properly are
not colored. In them there is nothing else than a certain power and disposition to
stir up a sensation of this or that color.’
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but the reflexive intuition against them is much stronger in this
case.
Hearing sounds is another good example. When a dog barks,
is what we hear a property of the dog? Or is it a property of
its larynx? Perhaps it could be a property of the air? Or of
some other physical object? What is being represented in such
a case – what is the content of the representation? When a
dog barks, the sound that we are experiencing is a property of
our percept or, more correctly, it is the percept itself, created
by our nervous system with the help of a dog moving its
vocal chords in a medium full of air at atmospheric pressure.
Enquiring into the intentional character of perception, we can
have several representations here depending on the flexibility of
defining the term ‘represents’: one could say that the percept
represents the movement of the dog’s vocal chords, or equally
well say that it represents the dog’s mood. As mentioned earlier,
it would be simpler to abandon such unnecessary complications
regarding ‘representations,’ ‘intentionality,’ ‘content’ etc., and
just ask about what is causing the perceptual experience. If
the answer includes objects/events from the physical world,
then this is proof that the perceptual world does not exist
in a vacuum. In the example of the dog, we perceive the
barking because there is a thief there, that the dog sees,
something which excites the dog, which makes it move its vocal
cords, which produces pressure changes in the surrounding
air, which excites cells in our cochlea and eventually leads
to the activation of auditory cortex and other parts of our
brain.
The fact that what we perceive are subjective properties of
our percepts rather than objective properties of physical objects
is also evident in cases in which the information entering the
system is open to more than one interpretations by the brain.
The Necker cube (Necker, 1832) is a classic example, and so
are other forms of bistable perception, such as binocular rivalry
(Blake and Logothetis, 2002). When a spinning dancer appears
to change direction in a stochastic manner without any change
in the physical stimulus itself 8, which property of the latter
is being ‘represented’ by perception? Moving objects in the
physical world can also change their direction continuously, but
at any particular point in time they have a particular direction
(not true in the case of bistable motion). An intentionalist
would perhaps argue that bistable motion is the represented
stimulus property, but this is not very satisfactory because
such a property does not seem to belong to the physical
world as we understand it. It would be better to just say
that the properties of the physical stimulus activate the brain
in a way that produces stochastic alternations between two
alternative percepts. The phenomenology of our experience
thus belongs to the experience itself, and there is no reason
to believe that things are different in normal cases of motion
perception, in which the physical stimulus is indeed moving
in a certain direction at any given time. What we experience
in both cases is a psychological property of the corresponding
percept, not a physical property of the worldly object. Similarly,
we can have cases in which motion is perceived despite the
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spinning_Dancer
stimuli being static, such as the motion-aftereffect (Wohlgemuth,
1911).
IS THERE A ‘CORRECT’ SENSING OF
THE PHYSICAL WORLD?
The so-called transparency-claim states that when we introspect
our experiences, what we perceive are not features of the
experience but rather features of the worldly objects (Harman,
1990; Tye, 2000). This sound like a good thing, because it
means that we are able to experience the world as it is rather
than as we see it. Unfortunately, it should be clear by now
that when one introspects his own perceptual experience, the
only thing he finds there are the properties of the experience
itself. If the transparency principle was true and we could ‘see
through’ our percepts to the real world directly, how could
we tell the difference between seeing an object and touching
an object? It could perhaps be argued that an object has two
types of properties, those to be seen and those to be touched,
but this is just a more complicated way of saying that the
object has properties that can activate either the visual or
the somatosensory system. Along this line of thought, Crane
attacks representationalism by saying that when one removes his
spectacles making objects appear blurry; this blurriness is clearly a
property of the experience rather than of the object (Crane, 2003).
However, his example silently assumes that with the spectacles
on we perceive the world as it is, leaving the door open to
counterarguments such as that we are actually not aware of the
blurriness but simply fail to represent the sharp boundaries of the
object (Tye, 2003). The truth is, spectacles or no spectacles, what
we perceive (sharpness, blurriness, color, motion) is the result of
the interaction of the physical stimulus with our visual system.
The former includes the physical object, light, the medium,
spectacles – everything that is outside our visual system. The
latter will transform, in an unknown but predetermined and
reliable way, physical properties to psychological properties,
which constitute our visual experience.
The usefulness of perception derives from the fact that its
characteristics do not only depend on the properties of the
perceptual system creating it, but also on the characteristics of
the physical objects in the real world. In Plato’s allegory, the
shape of the shadows seen by the chained prisoners depends
on the shape of the things passing by behind them, in front
of a burning fire. Objectivity is further assured by the fact that
there is a given deterministic way, a constant ‘algorithm’ which
transforms the physical stimulus into neuronal activation and
thus to the emergence of a specific percept. For a given perceptual
system, a red apple will always look red and a yellow banana will
always look yellow, irrespective of what ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ is like
for that particular system. Perception can ‘...yield knowledge of an
objective world beyond experience, and... put us in a position to
think about such a world...’ (Child, 1994, p. 148). In this way our
perceptual experiences make sense, helping us to detect constant
properties of our environment and gain knowledge about the
world in which we exist, thus satisfying the ‘epistemological hat’
of philosophical enquiries (Fish, 2010).
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Since percepts are subjective by virtue of the fact that they are
created by perceptual systems, could this mean that perception
hides from us the ‘truth’ of the real world? ‘If all I ever get is
smoke, how do I know what fire is like?’ (Campbell, 2002, p. 6).
The problem with this way of thinking is that only a percept is
(experientially) like something – the question has no meaning
with respect to a physical object. One can complain that the
percept of smoke is different to the percept of fire, but it is false
to wonder whether a physical object in reality feels different from
the experience that it produces. For example, Butchvarov (1980,
p. 273) claims that having a headache because of the presence of
carbon monoxide does not mean that you are conscious of carbon
monoxide. This is wrong: you are conscious of the presence of CO
by virtue of having a headache – having the perceptual experience
of a headache can equally well amount to being conscious of
the presence CO as when (hypothetically) seeing it, touching it,
smelling it, hearing it. You can also have a headache from other
reasons as well, say from CO2, and if the two types of headaches
feel different, then this is a good way to separate being conscious
of the presence of CO versus being conscious of the presence of
CO2. Even if they feel the same it is not a problem – as mentioned
above, in vision there are numerous examples of different stimuli
leading to the identical percept.
Most scientists would probably agree with naïve realism on
the fact that the external world shapes the contours of conscious
experiences (Martin, 2004, p. 64), but would disagree on the view
that the objects of awareness are actually the mind independent
objects that inhabit the world (Fish, 2010, p. 96). The idea that
we perceive the world ‘directly’ or ‘as it is’ can be disputed
by the fact that what reaches our brains is nothing more than
a neuronal signal, the result of sensory transduction at the
sensory receptors. Therefore, no light, or pressure, or objects,
or anything that exists in the physical world can enter into
our neuronal and mental universe. The physical world does
not ‘look’ or ‘feel’ like anything, unless there is a perceptual
system to look at it or feel it. It follows that our subjective
experience of the world is neither correct nor wrong, as the
latter does not have a ‘proper’ or ‘true’ experiential quality on
its own (unlike the case in Plato’s cave, where objects have true
appearances). The definite answer to Berkeley (1910) is that if
a tree falls in a forest and there is no one there to hear it,
there will be no sound. Similarly, the forest will not look, smell
or feel like anything, unless there is a perceptual system there
to create the corresponding perceptual experiences. So, to the
question of whether we experience the physical world ‘correctly’
(Crane, 1992, p. 139), the answer a scientist would give is that
we do not experience the world neither as it is nor as it is not
(Fish, 2010, p. 3), since without a perceptual system the world
alone has no perceptual quality.
CONCLUSION
A percept is something that emerges when the brain is
activated in a certain way and thus all perceptual experiences
(whether veridical, illusory, hallusinatory etc.) have a common
cause behind them: a given brain activation pattern. What
distinguishes between different cases of perception is what
has caused this activation pattern: light coming from a real
object, an epileptic seizure, chemicals, artificial stimulation with
electrodes implanted in the brain and so on. All of these
cases and many others, however, have a factor in common:
what causes the emergence of the percept is the fact that the
brain is activated in a particular way. Such a brain-centered
view of perception satisfies both the phenomenological and
the epistemological ‘hat’ (Fish, 2010) in a pretty adequate
manner: the former because it explains the properties of our
perceptual experiences as emerging from the properties of our
perceptual systems, and the latter because it grounds these
experiences to the properties of the objects in the physical
world. Therefore, we do not need to appeal to the presence
of mental objects, as sense data theory does, or qualia (Crane,
2000), as the adverbial theory does, in order to explain why
perceptual experiences feel the way they do. We also do not
need to wonder about whether we perceive the world as it
is, because there is no such thing as a ‘correct’ perception:
the physical world does not feel like anything, unless there
is a sensory system to create a perceptual experience of it.
Finally, we need not worry that perception is perhaps useless,
since our brains can, via their sensory organs, interact with
the physical world and produce activations (and thus mental
states) that are determined by the properties of physical objects,
making our perceptual experience ‘connected’ to the reality of our
environment and able to provide us with information about the
latter.
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